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COGNITIVE SEMIOTICS IN EDUCATION
Donald J. Cunningham and Paul E. Kehlel
Logic, in its general sense, is... only another name for semiotic
({sémeiötiké}), the quasi-necessary, or formal, doctrine of
signs. By describing the doctrine as "quasi-necessary," or
formal, I mean that we observe the characters of such signs as
we know, and from such an observation, by a process which I
will not object to naming Abstraction, we are led to
statements, eminently fallible, and therefore in one sense by no
means necessary, as to what must be the characters of all signs
used by a "scientific" intelligence, that is to say, by an
intelligence capable of learning by experience. As to that
process of abstraction, it is itself a sort of observation... [The
person] makes in his imagination a sort of skeleton diagram, or
outline sketch..., considers what modifications the
hypothetical state of things would require to be made in that
picture, and then examines it, that is, observes what he has
imagined. _. By such a process, which is at bottom very much
like mathematical reasoning, we can reach conclusions as to
what would be true of signs in all cases, so long as the
intelligence using them was scientific. The modes of thought
of a God, who should possess an intuitive omniscience
superseding reason, are put out of the question. Now the whole
process of development among the community of students of
those formulations by abstractive observation and reasoning of
the truths which must hold good of all signs used by a
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scientific intelligence is an observational science, like any
other positive science, notwithstanding its strong contrast to all
the special sciences which arises from its aiming to find out
what must be and not merely what is in the actual worldl.
(Peirce 2.227, emphases in original)
In this paper, we will propose that within this quotation and
throughout the work of Charles Sanders Peirce, there is a strongly
implied if not fully articulated a model of cognition in general, and
within educational settings, learning in particular that, if followed
more deliberately, would promote something of a revolution in the
instructional sciences. Given our limitations of space, we will focus
on Peirce's work on cognition and inquiry as they relate to learning.
We will argue that Peirce was able to foresee, in the late 19th and
early 20th century, the principles of collective and meaning-driven
models of leaming, cognition, and inquiry that are only now emerging
in psychology and education. Peirce's inability to communicate and
realize the practical implications of his semiotic ideas into culture,
and in our case pedagogy, during his lifetime was due in no small
measure to the times in which he lived, to the lack of contemporary
models or embodiments of his ideas. We feel that it is now time!
To advance our thesis, we first outline some key concepts from
Peirce, embedded in the quotation above, such as logic, reasoning,
abstraction and learning. We will then use these notions to examine
empirically some of the characteristics of mathematical problem
solving by viewing it through a semiotic lens. In closing we offer
examples of pedagogical insights we believe are directly supported by
a semiotic perspective, insights that lend greater specificity to
constructivist theories of leaming and suggest subtle but eventually
radical changes in instruction. r
Learning, Logic and Semiotic
In the paragraph quoted, Peirce equates logic and semiotic, a
stance that will be unfamiliar to those who remember their
undergraduate philosophy class where logic was a tool for teaching a
correct deductive inference and/or for manipulating abstract symbols.
1 C.S. PEIRCB, Collected papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, C. HARTSHORNE and
P. WEISS (eds), Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 19314965, 2.227,
emphases in original.
_ _ _* ÇOGNITIVE IN EDUQATIQN 37
Peirce's view is much grander---logic is the key to understanding
reality itself: “Therefore, we do not ask what really is, but only what
appears to every one of us in every minute of our lives"l. While
Peirce is describing the actions of someone engaging in
logic/semiotics to understand reality (i.e., a semiotician), in point of
fact he is also describing a process that underlies ordinary, everyday
cognition: semiosis.
As stated above, Peirce proposes that we observe the character of
signs that we perceive and, through a process of reasoning, move
towards structures that embody what must be true of those signs for
them to make sense to us as we learn and grow. The perceptive reader
will notice that we have changed the wording of Peirce's statement
but we believe our interpretation to be consistent with his views. For
example, we substituted the word perceive for the word know. Here
we seek to reconcile two famous assertions from Peirce, that the
"universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of
signs"2 and “a sign is not a sign unless it translates itself into another
sign in which it is more fully developed”3. So signs are everywhere,
but they only impact us if we take notice of them in some way, if they
are a part of or can be integrated within the structures we build to
represent the world. We substituted the word reasoning for
abstraction to avoid the, we believe, incorrect assumption that the
process of signification (taking one thing to stand for another) is
limited to a movement from the concrete to the abstract. The
movement could just as easily be from abstract to concrete or from
one sign system to another. The important point, to be elaborated
shortly, is that cognition can be seen as semiosis, the building up of
structures of signs through experiencei.
Peirce's use of the wordstaternents might be misinterpreted as
limited to verbal structures only, hence our substitution of the word
structures. These structures are “eminently fallible," They represent
our current belief about what must be the character of the signs under
consideration. The concept of belief is key in Peirce's view and he
spoke of a semiosis in general as a movement toward “fixing” a
1 twa., 2.84.
2 1bta.,5.44s.
3 1btd.,5.s94.
4 D.J. CUNNINGHAM, "Cognition as semiosis: The role of inference", Theory and
Psychology, 8, 1998, pp. 827-840.
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belief. The converse of belief is doubt and Peirce was very explicit in
drawing the distinction between them:
We generally know when we wish to ask a question and when
we wish to pronounce a judgment, for there is a dissimilarity
between the sensation of doubting and that of believing. But
this is not all that distinguishes doubt from belief. There is a
practical difference. Our beliefs guide our desires and shape
our actions... Doubt is an uneasy and dissatisfied state from
which we struggle to free ourselves and pass into the state of
belief; while (belief) is a calm and satisfactory state which we
do not wish to avoid, or to change to a belief in anything else.
On the contrary, we cling tenaciously, not merely to believing,
but to believing just what we do believel.
Peirce called such doubt “genuine doubt". As such it is situated
in our experience, not a methodological ploy as in Descartes' use of
doubt. Doubt arises when the structures we have created, our current
beliefs, do not account for some experience, when the character of
signs does not fit our understanding. Peirce proposed four methods of
resolving doubt and fixing beliefs: tenacity, authority, a priori, and
experiment. Briefly, tenacity is invoked whenever one holds on to
beliefs in the face of doubt and asserts that the beliefs will eventually
accommodate the doubtful event. We use the method of authority to
fix beliefs when we accept the beliefs of authority figures like
teachers or scientists. Nowhere is the method of authority more
widely used, and abused, than in the field of education. The a priori
method is invoked when our beliefs change in the context of already
existing structure of beliefs, a conceptual coherence to a worldview
that has served us well so far. The three methods described so far all
resolve doubt by opinion, stubbomly maintained, taken from others,
or reasoned from premises. The fourth method, which Peirce
preferred, is the method of experiment, where one seeks to remove
doubt by collecting observations, generating potential hypotheses to
account for the surprising experience, and teaching a conclusion
based upon the interplay of inferential processes.
Inference, in fact, is implicated in all the methods of resolving
doubt. Elsewherei Peirce describes three modes of inference
1 c.s. Prince, Op. ai., 5.370~3'/2.
2 E.g.,¿t›ft1.,5.145.
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-abduction, induction and deduction- through which observers can
build and work with structures of signs:
Deduction is the only necessary reasoning. It is the reasoning
of mathematics. It starts from a hypothesis, the truth or falsity
of which has nothing to do with the reasoning; and of course
its conclusions are equally ideal. The ordinary use of the
doctrine of chances is necessary reasoning, although it is
reasoning concerning probabilities. Induction is the
experimental testing of a theory. The justification of it is that,
although the conclusion at any stage of the investigation may
be more or less erroneous, yet the further application of the
same method must correct the error. The only thing that
induction accomplishes is to determine the value of a quantity.
It sets out with a theory and measures the degree of
concordance of that theory with fact. It can never originate any
idea whatsoever. No more can deduction. All the ideas of
science come to it by way of Abduction. Abduction consists in
studying facts and devising a theory to explain them. Its only
justification is that if we are ever to understand things at all, it
must be in that wayl.
In the case of the method of experiment, a surprising experience
might lead us to abduce a new hypothesis and examine it deductively
to see if it squares with the available facts. Suppose, for example I
held the view that individual members of a species tended to be larger
in colder climates. Recent data, however, had shown that this was not
true of fish. If I engage in abduction I might generate the hypothesis
that the original relationship only applies to mammals. If observation
showed that hypothesis to be true, then the surprising experience
would be a matter of course. Deductively I could link my hypothesis
to other varieties of animals and inductively test the consequences.
Similar inferential strategies can be observed in a priori, authority and
even tenacity.
The validity of our beliefs is tested in accord with Peirce's
pragmatic maxim:
Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical
bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have.
Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our
conception of the objectz.
1 laid.
2 raid., 5.402.
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If our beliefs are adequate to account for the phenomena before
us, then we are satisfied. It is doubt that drives semiosis.
One important source of doubt comes from comparing our
beliefs with others. Logic is grounded in the collective nature of
semiosis itself, and oriented toward future activity. Peirce's
understanding of community was in terms of both the present
communities of practice (scientist, citizen, family member, etc.), and
the “family” of all participants, past and future as well as present, who
have, are and will work on clarifying our ideas and understandings.
Finally, as what anything really is, is what it may finally come
to be known to be in the ideal state of complete information,
so that reality depends on the ultimate decision of the
community; so thought is what it is, only by virtue of its
addressing a future thought which is in its value as thought
identical with it, though more developed. In this way, the
existence of thought now depends on what is to be hereafter;
so that it has only a potential existence, dependent on the
future thought of the community* .
In summary, we have argued that the subject matter of semiotics
is semiosis, the action of signs in all domains of life. Human cognition
is accomplished entirely with signs»--we have no direct access to the
real world. Our understanding of the world is entirely mediated by
signs, and therefore to understand human cognition, we must
understand the nature of our signs: What is a sign? How is one sign
related to another sign? What do signs reveal about the real world?
What do they obscure? How are signs formed? What are the ways in
which signs can stand for something else? The identification,
understanding, and use of signs is a fundamental part of inquiry. In
fact, the process of semiotics within inquiry was seen to be an
emergent process, and one quite explicitly linked to our cognitive
natures:
Symbols grow. They come into being by development out of
other signs... We think only in signs. These mental signs are of
mixed nature; the symbol-parts of them are called concepts. If
a man makes a new symbol, it is by thoughts involving
concepts. So it is only out of symbols that new symbols can
grow. Omne symbolum de symbolo. A symbol, once in being,
spreads among the people. In use and in experience, its
1 raid., 5.316.
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meaning grows. Such words as force, law, wealth, marriage,
bear for us very different meanings from those they bore for
our barbarous ancestorsi.
Models of Mind
What is the character of these structures of signs, our beliefs?
Our claim here is that Peirce has provided us with a model of mind, a
model of cognition that was largely overlooked or incomprehensible
until an instantiation of it was readily available. Prior to this our
models of cognition were guided by a series of metaphors like
Thomdike's telephone switchboard. No one can doubt the impact that
computer technology has had on our philosophical and psychological
conceptions of mindﬁ, yet only recently has a technology emerged that
approaches the radical generativity of Peirce's model of semiosis. We
would like to review briefly two dominant computer metaphors of
mind before presenting a third that has recently emerged.
First is the notion of the mind as a symbol manipulator (SM), the
basic premise underlying traditional artificial intelligence but also
much of instructional design and development. SM assumes that the
mind is an instantiation of a Turing machine, a symbol manipulation
(e. g. Newell and Simon°s General Problem Solver3) device in which
every cognitive process is algorithmic in the same sense that computer
processes are algorithmic; that is, the mind works by processing
symbols according to rules. These symbols are entirely abstract and
independent of any given individual's experience of them; i.e., the
operation of the mind is completely independent of the person in
whom it is contained. Meaning is mapped on to these symbols via our
experiences in the world in a mind~independent manner. Our
understanding of the world is formed from a process of interacting
with, discovering reality "out there" and transferring that
understanding into the mind, forming internal representations that
determine our subsequent interactions with the environment. Symbols
1 1f›fa.,2.302.
2 E.g. G. SHANK and D.J. CUNNINGHAM, Modeling the six modes of Peircean
abduction for educcmona! purposes, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the
Midwest Al and Cognitive Science Conference, Bloomington, Indiana, April 1996 ;
D.J. CUNNINGHAM, “Cognition as semiosis: The role of inference", op. cif.
3 A. NE\vELL and H. SIMON, Human problem solving, Englewood Cliffs, NJ , Prentice
Hall, 1972.
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(or concepts) derive their meaning from their capacity to match (to a
greater or lesser extent) aspects of reality. Any individual's internal
representation will certainly depart from reality, but it does seem
necessary to assume that, in principle, there must exist a conceptual
framework which is entirely general and neutral, a single correct,
completely objective way of representing the world. Learning is a
process of information acquisition, processing according to innate or
acquired rules, and storage for future use.
More recently cognitive scientists have proposed a metaphor of
mind as a network (NET) of simple processing units, a view variously
called connectionism or parallel distributed processingl.
Connectionist models assume that symbols are learned consequences
of particular experiences or interactions in the world which are then
mapped on or distributed across neural-like networks. Connectionism
seeks to avoid the limitations of the SM view and capitalize on
precisely the experiential character of human concepts. It also
deliberately links with our emerging knowledge of brain function;
e.g., the brain would have to do massively parallel processing to
accomplish even the most ordinary cognitive act, let alone the serial
operations proposed by SM models. Connectionism is the notion that
intelligence emerges from the interactions of large numbers of simple
processing units. Representations are not localized in some general
purpose symbol; rather they are distributed throughout a network of
simple processing units according to patterns of activation which have
emerged as a result of experience. Unlike SM models, knowledge is
not stored as a static copy of a pattem in long term memory with no
real difference between what is retrieved and stored in working
memory. Representation is an active process. What is stored in
connectionist models are connection strengths between units that
allow these patterns to be recreated (re-presented or reconstructed).
Consequently, learning is “a matter of finding the right connection
strengths so that the right pattern of activation will be produced under
the right circumstances..., as a result of tuning of connections to
capture the interdependencies between activations that the network is
exposed to in the course of processing”2.
i See, for example, D. RUMELHART and J. MCCLELLAND, Parallel distributed
processing, Cambridge, 1986.
2 1bfa.,p.32.
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SM and NET models are alike in that both characterize mind as
separate from the environment and as information processing bound
within individuals. A major difference is that knowledge is a matter of
storage and retrieval according to rules in the SM view, but a function
of distributed connection strengths and network activation for the
NET position. It is this difference which sets the stage for the
possibility of some fresh thinking about the teaching/learning process.
The alternative we wish to propose here builds upon Peirce's
notion of unlimited semiosis. The mind is extended beyond the brain
and directly into the action of signs. Here we deliberately blur or
obliterate such common distinctions as environment/individual,
insideloutside, and self/other. Loosely speaking, our work -primarily
the blurring of brain/environment boundaries- places us in the
emerging situated, or distributed, cognition domainl. But our concept
of the nature and spread of distribution with an emphasis on signs and
inference as constituting semiosis takes us far beyond most models of
distributed or situated cognition. Elsewhere we? have labeled this
view MIND AS RHIZOME (RZM), a metaphor inspired by Umberto
Ecoïl.
A rhizome is a root crop, a prostrate or underground system of
stems, roots, and fibers whose fruits are tubers, bulbs and leaves. A
tulip is a rhizome as is rice grass, even the familiar crab grass. The
metaphor of rhizome specifically rejects the inevitability of such
notions as hierarchy, order, node, kernel, or structure. The tangle of
roots and tubers characteristic of rhizomes is meant to suggest a form
of mind where l) Every point might and can be connected with every
other point, making infinite juxtaposition possible, 2) There are no
fixed points or positions, only connections (relationships between
seeming points which only reveal more relationships upon closer
inspection), 3) The structure is dynamic, constantly changing, such
that if a portion of the rhizorne is broken off at any point it could be
reconnected at another point, leaving the original potential for
juxtaposition in place, 4) There is no hierarchy or genealogy
Î See, for example, Whitson`s chapter in D. KIRSHNER and J. WHITSON, Simared
cognition : Social, semiotic, and psychological perspectives, Mahwah, NJ, Erlbaum,
1997.
2 E.g. D.J. CUNNINGHAM, “Beyond educational psychology: Steps toward an
educational semiotic", Educational Psychology Review, n° 4, 1992, pp. 165-194.
3 U. ECO, Semiotics and the pliilosopliy of language, Bloornington, IN, Indiana
University Press, 1984; see also G. DELEUZE and F. GUATTAR1, “Rhizome”, in
G. DELEUZE and F. GUATTAR1 (eds), On the Line, New York, Semiotext(e), 1983.
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contained as where some points are inevitably superordinate or prior
to others, and 5) The rhizome whole has no outside or inside, but is
rather an open network which can be connected with something else
in all of its dimensions.
The notion of a rhizome is a difficult one to imagine because we
so quickly try to impose latent SM or NET frameworks on it, and
because any attempt to statically picture one risks minimizing its
dynamic, temporal, and even self-contradictory character. Ecol has
labeled the rhizome as “an inconceivable globality” to highlight the
impossibility of any global, overall description of the network. Since
no one (user, Scientist or philosopher) can describe the whole, we are
left with “local” descriptions, a vision of one or a few of the many
potential structures derivable from the rhizome. Every local
description of the network is a hypothesis, an abduction constantly
subject to falsification. To quote Eco:
Such a notion (...) does not deny the existence of structured
knowledge; it only suggests that such a knowledge cannot be
recognized and organized as a global system; it provides only
“local” and transitory systems of knowledge which can be
contradicted by alternative and equally “local” cultural
organizations; every attempt to recognize these local
organizations as unique and “global” ~ignoring their
partiality- produces an ideological bias2.
This last statement emphasizes the point that we are not
proposing the metaphor of rhizome for an individual mind, but to
minds as distributed in social, cultural, historical and institutional
contexts. Except as a degenerate case, there is no such thing as a
single mind, unconnected to other minds or to their (collective) social
cultural constructions. Thinking, or whatever we choose to call the
activity of mind, is always dialogic, connected to another; either
directly as in some communicative action or indirectly via some form
of semiotic mediation-signs and/or tools appropriated from the
sociocultural context.
We are connected to other people individually but also
collectively as in the speech communities or social languages in
which we are all embedded. We are connected to the sociocultural
milieu in which we operate, a milieu characterized by the tools
1 U. ECO, op. cit., p. 83.
2 raid., p. s4.
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(computers, cars, television, and so forth) and sign systems (language,
mathematics, drawing, etc.) which we may appropriate for our
thinking. Thus thinking is not an action which takes place within mind
within a body, but rather at the connections, in the interactions. But it
is worth saying again that this thinking is always “local”, always a
limited subset of the potential (unlimited) rhizomous connections.
Learning, then, is neither a matter of leaming the symbols of the
world and the rules for manipulating them, nor of activating the right
connections in the brain. It is, rather, a matter of constructing and
navigating a local, situated path through a rhizomous labyrinth, a
process of dialogue and negotiation with and within a local
sociocultural context. In his popular novel The Name of the Rose,
Umberto Eco' describes a medieval library, a labyrinth of passages,
stairways and chambers filled with books. The library is a rhizome (as
much as any actual existent thing can represent “an inconceivable
globality”) and leaming is illustrated by Brother William, the main
character of the novel, feeling and groping his way through the
library. As Brother William constructs a path (or pattern of
connections) through the library, one of only many possible paths, he
is transforming his means of participating in the community of
scholars, both those using the library (constructing their own paths)
and those who have written manuscripts contained therein. Brother
William is thereby learning the activities that will allow him to be
effective in that community --«to become a site for additional semiosis.
In our view, he is not acquiring and internalizing, not building an
abstract mental representation of the library and its contents. He
simultaneously constitutes and is constituted by rhizomatic growth.
The notion of an unlimited potential for semiosis as embodied in
the metaphor of rhizome has been largely ignored in cognitive
theory? No doubt the comparison of mind with a root crop was
problematic (we did suffer the unkind comparison with Mr. Potato
Head more than once). But the advent of the World Wide Web has
provided a propitious moment for the ascendancy of Peirce's theory.
While the “results” of a connection to WWW is experienced via an
interface with one's local workstation, that experience is possible only
as a result of connections with many (potentially an infinite number)
1 U. Eco, The name of the rose, W. Weaver (trans), New York, Harcourt, Brace and
Jovanovich, 1983.
2 With some welcome exceptions like M. DRISCOLL, Psychology of leai°ning for
instrucrrion, Needham Heights, MA, Allyn & Bacon, 2000.
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of servers all over the world. The local workstation both contributes to
(constructs) and is constructed by its connections. This is precisely the
sort of connectivity and potential envisioned for the rhizomel.
Mathematical Problem Solving as Semiosis
In taking our rhizome model closer to the classroom we report on
empirical semiotic studies of mathematical problem solving and use
them to make pedagogical observations. In the discussion below we
hope to give the flavor of what a cognitive semiotic lens can
contribute to pedagogy beyond the empirical study of cognition. We
studied problem solving in a mathematical-modeling context that
begins with the identification of a problem in an initially non-
mathematical context, or sign system. Often, as one gains an
understanding of the problem, specific mathematical representations
(mathematical sign systems) might be seen as useful in reasoning
about the problem. By making simplifying assumptions and forming
various abstractions between the original situation and a mathematical
system, the original problem is transposed into a problem about a
mathematical representation, or model -the problem is
“mathematized”. At this point, familiar patterns of mathematical
inference can be applied and perhaps extended in efforts to solve the
mathematical problem. Finally, the results of these mathematical
manipulations must be interpreted in the context of the original
problem to judge their validity.
Although the process just described seems very linear, there is in
practice much. back and forth movement between original problem
context and various mathematical representations; however, note that
if an expert mathematical modeler comes across a familiar problem
for which there is a good known model, then there probably is a
linearity to her thinking that reduces the problem to a mere exercise in
application. This highly routine behavior is where other models of
cognition enjoy some success--but a limited success that doesn't
even attempt to reflect the greater globality of the rhizome. We are
interested in what people do when confronted with a true problem--
not a mere exercise. Consider the following problem and
accompanying diagram in Figure l.
I This issue is discussed more comprehensevely in D.J. CUNNINGHAM, “Beyond
educational psychology: Steps toward an educational serniotic”, op. cif.
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Alaskan Pipeline Problem
The Alaskan oil pipeline consists of a network of pipes each with
a maximum flow rate (e.g., barrels/second). Flow through the network
must satisfy 3 rules:
i) flow is only allowed in the direction indicated on each pipe
ii) the actual flow in any pipe can not exceed the pipels
capacity
iii) the total flow arriving at a node must equal the total flow
leaving the node
In the diagram of the pipeline below (numbers represent
maximum flow capacities, and arrows indicate direction of flow), we
are interested in the maximum possible flow through the network-~
from Prudhoe Bay to Seward. Find the maximum possible flow.
Provide a proof that your solution is indeed the largest possible flow
and/or a general algorithm (method) for finding the maximum ﬂow in
any network.
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Figure 1. A network based on the Alaskan pipeline
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We studied ten groups, comprised of individuals or pairs of
people, between 18 and 24 years of age, as they solved the above
problem along with several others. Each problem solving session
lasted between two and three hours; we were non-directive observers
taking notes to supplement analysis of the video tapes and audio
transcriptions of the problem-solving sessions. The methodology and
results are presented in Kehle's dissertation' and discussions are also
found in Kehle and Cunningham2 , and Kehle and Lester3.
Although some numbers are present in the original context,
making the problem somewhat mathematical in flavor, there is no
clear indication of what to do with the numbers in order to solve the
problem. For most people, some abduction is called for before a
model or way of working with the problem emerges. Some readers
might recognize the problem setting as creating an opportunity for the
discovery or construction of the Minimum Cut Maximum Flow
theorem in the mathematical discipline of graph theory.
Our study of people”s work on this and other problems relied
upon semiotic parsings of video-taped problem-solving sessions. Our
parsings sought to identify locally coherent sign systems, (i.e.,
structures) and the dominant inferential activity within and among
these systems; attention was also paid to the dominating qualities
(iconic, indexic, and symbolic) of the signs employed by the problem
solvers; but here we focus on the role of inference and of abduction in
particular. Figure 2 presents the work of a person who was very
successful with the Alaskan Pipeline problem despite having very
little knowledge of graph theory, and none specifically of network
ﬂow situations.
Î P. KEHLE, “An empirical semiotic analysis of abstraction in mathematical
modeling", Dissertation Abstrars International, 60 (06A), 1949 (University
Microﬁlms N° AAG9932664), 1998.
2 P. KEHLE and D.J.CUNNINGHAM, “Semiotics and mathematical modeling",
International Jozrmal ofApplied Semiotics, 3 (1), 2002, pp. 113-129.
3 P. KEHLE and F. LESTER, “A semiotic look at modeling behavior", in D. LBSH and
l-I. DOERR (eds), Beyond consmrch`vism.' models & modeling perspecﬁves on
mathematics problem solving, leaming and teaching, l-lillsdale, NJ, Erlbaum,
2002.
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Figure 2. Contextual inferential parsing of Abe's work on the Alaska pipeline
problem
One of the foci of our work was examination of the generation of
mathematical representations for working on the problem, and hence,
these types of abductions are distinguished from other abductive
moves in the context parsing in Figure 2. For our present purposes,
note that all of these abductions are similar in that they are tentative
attempts to make sense of unfamiliar situations, and that they all
involve some analogical basis.
The analogical basis of abduction is perfectly revealed in Abe`s
[a pseudonym] first reaction to the map of Alaska when he declared
that it “looks like an electric circuit with resistances on wires,”
knowing fully that it was not a circuit. This metacognitive awareness
of the nature of rhizomatic connection Abe was making is another
strength of our semiotic model and its fidelity to cognition”s ability to
reflect upon its own activity. Note that both SM and NET models
would likely lead to unrecoverable failures at this point because of a
category error. But in casting about for something more familiar than
pipelines, Abe made a rhizomatic connection -equally rich in future
generative capacity and abductive tentativeness- between electric
circuits and pipelines. We suspect that the iconic similarity of the two
images (one real, the other brought to consciousness from memory)
drove this connection which then led to the possibility of somehow
treating the pipeline problem as a system of simultaneous equations of
the sort used to solve electric-circuit problems. This move is not
inductive because the role of pipe capacities is opposite to that of
resistor resistances. This gap is precisely where the analogy doesn't fit
perfectly and why there is an analogy at all -in this sense a perfect
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analogy cannot exist because were the resemblance between two
things is perfect then we simply have two instances belonging to the
same category. 9
The generative power of free»-wheeling rhizomatic connections
lies in the analogie space between two things. It is in this space that
semiosis or cognition occurs. A focus on this analogical gap entails a
subtle shift in understanding cognition that moves us beyond the SM
and NET mind-experience duality. The shift recognizes that cognition
is inseparable from the signs (e.g., for pipelines, circuits, and
equations), interpretants (i.e., the nature of the potential inferential
connections among these signs within Abe), and the given structure in
the pipeline context. In Eleanor Duckworth's languagel, Abe had a
“wonderful idea” of the sort that is not aimed for in traditional
approaches to the development of rote or mastery learning. We
contend that it was Abe + environment that gave rise to the wonderful
idea and that it is this broader site that is the proper focus of cognitive
study and pedagogical intervention.
Return to Figure l for a moment, and consider that the box
labeled “graph theory minimum cuts” unlike several of the other
context boxes was a wholly new site of inferential activity for Abe.
His work on this problem was exceptional in the degree of clarity with
which he constructed the Min-Cut-Max~Flow theorem. Abe was not
unique however in his ability to construct this understanding;
however, most other successful problem solvers took much more
convoluted paths toward the final result. Abe°s efficient navigation of
the analogical spaces was what distinguished his work rendering a
textbook example of abductive sense-making.
A SM or NET metaphor would downplay the role of the
analogical gap and perhaps even view it as a hurdle to the top~down
teaching of the Min-Cut-Max-Flow theorem, or to the training of a
person to its use and subsequent recall in appropriate situations. The
power of human thought lies in the forming of novel connections and
their reflexive evaluation, and we believe both Abe°s understanding of
network ﬂow and his capacity for solving future novel problems are
richer for his rhizomatic activity in the analogical gaps he navigated
while working on the pipeline problem. Furthermore, we point out
that for any student first encountering any “topic”, she is engaged in
1 E. DUCKWORTH, The having of wonderful ideas and other essays on teaching and
learning (2nd ed.), New York, NY, Teachers College Press, 1996.
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navigation of analogical gaps that are initially unknown to her and her
teachers --she is engaged in abduction. A “topic” becomes a topic only
with hindsight and much experience, and it is a mistake to ignore, and
even worse to rush or prepackage the acquisition of this hindsight and
experience in educational settings. The result is often a lifeless inert
bunch of facts or skills. Instead, teachers and students need all focus
more on the nature of their inferential movement and what it reveals
about their inextricable connections with environment.
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Figure 3. Context parsing of Ann and Bev's work on the Alaska pipeline
problem
Brieﬂy, compare the work in Figure 3 with that in Figure 2.
What is most notable about this unsuccessful work on the Alaska
pipeline problem, is the absence of analogy~sustaining intermediate
contexts, the absence of attempts to interpret their mathematical
results (inductive moves), and a very limited range cognitive activity
in general. Although the initial problem context was also unfamiliar to
them (as it was to Abe), they chose to work in a very familiar
mathematical context and resisted proddings to examine their work
more closely. They were satisfied with their work on the problem. We
believe their work to be typical of unsuccessful modelers who try to
blindly apply inert knowledge to a problem --forcing a fit that might
not be good* out of desire for the comfort offered by familiar
deductive manipulations they take to be mathematics. Recall Peirce's
of the unease and discomfort brought about my doubt. We suspect
that Ann and Bev differ greatly from Abe in the degree to which they
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understand the role of some cognitive dissonance -a degree that
matches the gap in their sense-making abilities.
What is to be gained from the RZM metaphor? Mary Catherine
Bateson captures the role analogy and metaphor play in human sense
making and learning: “The solution is not to purge metaphors from
speech and try to ignore them; the solution is to take responsibility for
the choice of metaphors, to savor them and ponder their suggestions,
above all to live with many and take no one metaphor as absolute”1.
In setting the RZM, SM, and NET metaphors beside each other, a
juxtapositioning technique urged by Batesonz, what do we find? The
part of cognition that SM gets right, is the role of limited memory and
sign recognition -the ability to not have to always look up the word
“word” when we see it. A NET approach helps us understand why
some signs might trigger some inferential moves rather than others,
and it begins to help us see the role of connections. What the RZM
metaphor adds to the mix is the unlimited nature of the connections
that make semiosis pragmatic beyond the initially prescribed and
proscribed types of inputs and outputs a neural network is constrained
by; and that more fully captures the bottom-up trajectory of sense
making in contrast to the top-down training of rules for symbolic
manipulation.
The individual symbol`s degree of match with some aspect of
reality in the SM model gives way to a RZM notion of fidelity of the
relationships among an extended sign system and its associated
inferential pattems with those aspects of reality this sign system helps
us make sense of. Ournotion of truth is implicated by a semiotic
perspective that joins thought, sign and environment so intimately.
Truth as correspondence between representation and object makes
less sense when representation and object and thought are one at the
deeper level we suggest. We are left with a notion of truth that is
much more pragmatic (Peirce wouldn't objectl) and closer to the
fidelity among pattems of inference within a local sign system. By
fidelity we do not mean loyalty to another, but rather the mutuality of
relationships that results in sustainability or persistence: ways of
thinking that prove useful both within given contexts and as points of
future analogical gap creating and navigating. This fidelity reveals as
1 M.C. BATESON, Peripheral visions: Learning along the way, New York, Harper
Collins Publishers, 1995, p. 141.
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it is shaped by the constraints on semiosis in a particular setting: the
Peircean notion of finding “out what must be and not merely what is
in the actual world”'. .losephson and Josephson°s2 characterizing of
abduction as truth generating, deduction as truth preserving, and
induction as truth confirming needs to be taken to heart not only at the
societal or cultural level at which Einstein°s E = mc2 is relevant but
also at the individual level at which Mary°s making sense of what 1/2
of 3/8 is, or of how a pendulum works, or of what “freedom” means
all begin with abduction and not with her teacher's -influenced by
long term familiarity- inductive understanding of these things.
Constructivism is a popular pedagogical model within
educational circles today3, but constructivism requires more explicit
frameworks for helping teachers and students develop powerful
strategies and practices for creating, manipulating, and interpreting
sign systems they are tangled in--inextricably so. Other than a partial
freeing, often in unspecified ways, of students from the traditional
narrowing of semiosis to an imitation and regurgitation of a limited
two-fold understanding of signification, constructivism often fails to
provide guidance when in fact it can. Cognition viewed through a
semiotic lens can provide this guidance. Below are highlights of what
we are finding characterize not only good problem solvers, but good
learners as well; and these traits are ones that bear closer attention on
the parts of both students and their teachers.
Drawing Upon Developed Sign Systems--Juxtapositions
Successful problem solvers drew upon familiar, well-developed
sign systems. Although part of the genius afforded us by semiosis lies
in our ability to abduce or structure novel sign systems as we agree
upon various signifying acts, more-successful problem solvers
initially juxtaposed more familiar contexts with the original problem.
The less-successful participants often failed to bring much in the way
of other knowledge that they possessed to the problem, and instead,
i C.S. PBIRCE, op. cit., 2.227, emphases in original.
2 J. JOSEPHSON and S. JOSEPHSON, Abductive inference: Compntation, philosophy,
technology, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994.
3 E.g. T. DUFFY and D.J. CUNNINGHAM, “Constructivismz Implications for the design
and delivery of instruction", in D. JONASSEN (ed.), Handbook of Research on
Educational Comnntnications and Technology, New York, Macmillan, 1996,
pp. 170-198.
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restricted their sense making to the original problem statement (e.g.,
Ann and Bev). The extent of a person”s familiarity with the
juxtaposed sign system corresponded to the comprehensiveness of
their final solutions. On those rare occasions where participants
generated what was for them new mathematics, this generation
occurred only after a long period of work with more familiar sign
systems, suggesting that such novel behavior is preceded by reﬂective
work within familiar sign systems -novelty is born out of familiarity.
Seeking Out and Tolerating Multiple Levels of Significance
Once intentional juxtapositioning is underway, or implicit
juxtapositions have been taken note of, the more successful problem
solvers simultaneously entertained many possible ways of making
sense of and approaching the problems. One person epitomized this
aspect of reflexive attention by sometimes interrupting himself to
generate new possibilities. His partner sometimes cut short his
juxtapositioning by pleading with him to stick to one thought. Mind as
rhizome is not afraid of making lots of connections, and in fact needs
them for growth.
A Playful Disposition Toward Signs
A more subtle and subjective aspect of a reflexive awareness of
one”s inferential activity concerns the general dispositions of problem
solvers toward their work. More successful problem solvers tended to
display a playful disposition that reflects an intrinsic enjoyment in
considering what different ways of thinking about a problem have to
offer. Accompanying this playfulness was a background assumption
that playing with signs in different ways was pragmatic. This
playfulness was most pronounced when someone had an insight
leading to a new way of thinking about a problem and became excited
as a result. How often is time made for this kind of serious play in
today's classrooms? How often are students encouraged to pursue
tentative understandings (often seen as an inefficient use of time) that
in turn will give rise to understandings of greater fidelity and
persistence (Peirce's fixing of belief)'?
In conclusion, perhaps we should simply rephrase one of the
grandfathers of the study of mathematical problem solving, George
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Polya, turning his dictum that we “teach guessing” into “let us teach
and study abduction”--in so far as teaching means providing
opportunity for the exercise of abduction and the reflexive analysis of
it. Placing inference and abduction at the center of classroom
discourse requires us to reconsider such traditional top-down notions
of scope and sequence, objectives, the nature of mastery leaming, and
what it is exactly that learners are constructing when engaged in
various activity. How can the space be created in hectic schools for
the serious tentative play that gives rise to sense? A semiotic
perspective can help guide educators as they take the most significant
step: making the act of learning, (i.e., semiosis) as much a focus of
classroom discourse as is any particular topic or objective on the
syllabus. The time for semiotic°s ability to serve as both method and
meta-method has come.
